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A population sample consisting of 110 college students was
placed into one of three principled reasonini= groups (low, medium,
and high) based on individual P scores on the Defining Issues Test.
Based on previous research, it was predicted that individuals low
in principled reasoning would score high on measures of deference
(conformity) and affiliation (social appro-al) and low on measures
of autonomy, intraception (analytical ability), and abstractness.
Those individuals in the high principled reasoning group would
have opposit( need structures. They should be low on measures of
deference and affiliation and high on autonomy, intraception and
abstractness in comparison to the low group. Those individuals
with medium pricipled reasoning scores should be higher on measures
of intraception and abstractness than the low principled reasoning
group. Personality variable scores were obtained using the Edwards
Personal Preference Scale and the Abstract Orientation Scale. None
of the comparisons were significantly different on affiliation for
any of the groups. In addition, none of the group comparisons
between the low and medium groups were significantly different from
one another. The results indicated the high group was significantly
higher on deference and abstractness compared with the low group.
The high group was also signigi(:antly higher than the m.dium group
on measures of ibtraception, autonomy and abstractness. The groups
were also evaluated using the discriminant analysis procedure. The
analysis combined the personality variables into two discriminant
functions both of which contained significant discriminating power and
were able to discriminate between the three principled reasoning
groups. The first function contained 7A% of the total discriminating
power and was primarily composed of abstractness, deference, intra-
ception and autonomy. The second function was composed of autonomy,
deference and affiliation and contained the remaining U% of
discriminating power. In adJition, the derived functions were able
to correctly classify the correct principled reasoning group of (40
of the subjects.
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The Ability of Selected Personality
Variables to Distinguish between Three Levels of
Principled Reasoning Scores on the Defining Issues Test
Morality has long been a primary concern of philosophers and
religious leaders. Within the last sixty years, psychologists have
also become interested in the field of moral development. Their
research includes both the components which comprise morality and
links between morality and other aspects of one's general development.
Most moral development the'orists would agree that the function of
morality is to provide a system of social cooperation by defining
individual limits and obligations (Rest, 1979b). Morality provides
a plan to distribute the benefits and responsibilities of society by
establishing rules for governing both acceptable and unacceptable
behaviors. While most theorists agree on the function of morality,
they do not agree on whether morality is a cognitive construct or part
of one's personality development.
A number of theorists support the idea that morality is part of
one's general personality. Erikson (1950) has defined eight stages
which shape one's personality. Morality develops in stage three
(autonomy versus shame and doubt). In line with the traditional
psychoanalytical approach, morality (rule adherence) is viewed as a
means of avoiding shame and guilt by adhering to strict codes of accept-
able behavior. Without this code, an individual would not have
direction and would suffer from a great deal of doubt and insecurity.
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Erikson believes that everyone desires to be included within a societal
group and accepts the limitations placed upon them by that group.
Morality is believed to be, in part, the principle of law and order
which allows one to have one's will affirmed and delineated within a
societal order of things. This principle establishes an individual's
privileges, limitations, obligations, and rights. Within this frame-
work, as one matures, a sense of individual autonomy also develops
which, combined with the principle of law and order, establishes a sense
of justice. It is the sense of justice and fair play which Erikson
defines as morality.
Hogan (1976) feels that moral development needs to be integrated
within a general theory of personality, although he disagrees with
Erikson on the manner in which morality develops. His theory is based
on the assumptions that everyone has a need for approval and affiliation
along with an attention-seeking, rule-following orientation. Individuals
do what is deemed acceptable and worthy of approval. Morality develops
from two personality orientations: a role structure and a character
structure.
Role structure is based on the assumption that individuals are
motivated toward social interaction. These interactions crystallize
into role-typified ways of presenting oneself in order to facilitate
interaction. Over time, each person develops a set of self-images or
model personality types (honest versus dishonesty, kindness versus
cruelty) and accepts that model as true of him/her self. These
self-images eventually become lifestyles which govern moral behavior.
Character structure comprises the second orientation which
determines moral development. Character structure develops with
regards to the conventional rules and uanctiuns of a culture. These
attitudes are learned through identification with and imitation of
significant others. Hogan believes that an individual's personality
and need structure (need for approval and conformity) provides both the
motivation and means by which morality is developed. Individuals are
motivated to do those things which win approval and acceptance.
Lawrence Kohlberg (1958) has developed a theory of moral develop-
ment which stresses both cognitive and affective components. Much of
the research conducted by cognitive theorists has been based upon
Kohlberg's cognitive-development approach. He views moral development
as a cognitive process with strong ties to personality. He has develop-
ed a typology of definite and universal moral stages which he hypo-
thesizes may form distinct personality types. While personality traits
may provide some reinforcement to remain within a particular moral
orientation, Kohlberg states that individuals move from one stage to the
next through largely cognitive processes. He contends that each of his
successive stages represents a higher and more adequate level of think-
ing. As one's environment changes, becoming more complex, one is moti-
vated to pursue better ways to cope with these increased demands by
utilizing a higher and more adequate stage of moral reasoning.
Kohlberg (1958) has elaborated six cognitive stages of moral
judgement. These are based on subjects' resolutions of hypothetical
moral dilemmas in which obedience to laws, rules and authority conflict
with the needs and welfare of other individuals. Kohlberg feels that
moral growth is the result of transformations that occur in an
individual's form or structure ofthow-ht rather than an increased
knowledge of cultural rules.
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While moral content varies across cultures, Kohlberg (1976)
contends that the underlying cognitive structures are universal and
sequential. In other words, regardless of the dilemma, the underlying
moral judgements and evaluations made by the individual will be
relatively the same regardless of cultural influences. Kohlberg's
typology contains three distinct levels of moral thinking, each of
which has two related stages. (see table 1).
At the pre-conventional level, the child is responsive to cultural
rules of good and bad or right and wrong, but responds to them in terms
of the consequences of the action. For example, stage one individuals
conform to rules and regulations to avoid punishment, while stage two
individuals adhere to those actlons which satisfy their own needs. The
second level, the conventional level, is characterized by conformity to
personal expectations and support of the social order. Stage three
individuals exhibit behaviors which will gain them social approval by
being "nice" people. The fourth stage is termed the lam and order orien-
tation correct behavior consist:; of doing one's duty and maintaining
the existing social order. At the postconventional level of moral
development, the emphasis is on moral principles that go beyond the
social order. The fifthstage characteristically has utilitarian tones,
while the sixth stage defines rights in terms of ethical principles
similar to the Golden Rule.
Kohlberg (1973) has expanded the fifth stage into stages 5A and 58
because he feels that there are two different orientations within this
stage. Stage 5A individuals make moral decisions using a utilitarian
perspective which may go against existing laws. Stage 5B individuals
recognize a higher law of inalienable rights which they scrupulously
Table 1
Definition of Moral Stages
I. Preconventional Level
At this level, the child is responsive to cultural rules and labels
of good and bad, right and wrong, but interprets these labels in terms of
either the physical or the hedonistic consequences of action (punishment,
reward, exchange of favors) or in terms of the physical power of those who
enunciate the rules and labels. This level is divided into the following
two stages:
Stage 1: The punishment and obedience orientation.
The physical consequences of action determine its goodness or badness
regardless of the human meaning or value of these consequences. Avoidance
of punishment and unquestioning deference to power are valued in their own
right, not in terms of respect for an underlying moral order supported by
punishment and authority (the latter being stage 4).
Stage 2: The instrumental-relativist orientation.
Right action consists of that which instrumentally satisfies one's
own needs and occasionally the needs of others. Human relations are viewed
in terms like those of the marketplace. Elements of fairness, of reciprocity
and equal sharing are present, but they are always interpreted in a physical
pragmatic way. Reciprocity is a matter of "you scratch my back and I'll




At this level, maintaining the expectations of the individual's family,
group, or nation is perceived as valuable in its own right, regardless of
immediate and obvious consequences. The attitude is not only one of
conformity to personal expectations and social order, but of loyalty to
it, of actively maintaining, supporting, and justifying the order and of
identifying with the persons or group involved in it. At this level,
there are the following two stages:
•
Stage 3: The interpersonal concordance or "good b_pi-nice girl" orientation.
Good behavior is that which pleases or helps others and is approved
by them. There is much conformity to stereotypical images of what is
majority or "natural" behavior. Behavior is frequently judged by intention-
"he means well" becomes important for the first time. One earns approval by
being "nice."
Stage 4: The "law and order" orientation.
There is orientation toward authority, fixed rules, and the maintenance
of the social order. Right behavior consists of doing one's duty, showing
respect for authority and maintaining the given social order for its own sake.
III. Post-Conventional, Autonomous, or Principled Level
At this level, there is a clear effort to define moral values and
principles which have validity and application apart from the authority of
the groups or persons holding these principles and apart from the individual's
own identification with these groups. This level again has two stages:
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Table I (continued)
III. Post-Conventional, Autonomous, or Principled Level
Stage 5: The social-contract legalistic orientation.
Generally with utilitarian overtones, right action tends to be
defined in terms of general individual rights and in terms of standards
which have been critically examined and agreed upon by the whole society.
There is a clear awareness of the relativism of personal values and opin-
ions and a corresponding emphasis upon procedural rules for reaching
consensus. Aside from what is constitutionally and democratically agreed
upon, the right is a matter of personal "values" and "opinion." The result
is an emphasis upon the "legal point of view", but with an emphasis upon
the possibility of changing law in terms of social utility (rather than
freezing it in terms of Stage 4 "law and order"). Outside the legal realm,
free agreement, and contract is the binding element of obligation. This
is the "official" morality of the American Government and Constitution.
Stage 6: The universal ethical principle orientation.
Right is defined by the decision of conscience in accord with self-
chosen ethical principles appealing to logical comprehensiveness, universal-
ity, and consistency. These principles are abstract and ethical (the
Golden Rule, the categorical imperative), they are not concrete moral rules
like the Ten Commandments. At heart, these are universal principles of
justice of the reciprocity and equality of the human rights and of respect
for the dignity of human beings as individual persons.
Note. (Adapted from L. Kohlberg, 1973)
10
attempt to maintain. This f.ould lw r..14.rrid 1,, a:. a "-onscience"
orientation. A stage 5B individual would argue that a utilitarian
model of law denies the rights of the minority while supporting the
views of the majority.
Kohlberg's cognitive-developmental theory is a comprehensive theory
of moral development for a number of reasons. In addition to incorporat-
ing both cognitive and affective components, his theory explains both
the development of moral reasoning and the influence of environment
factors throughout one's lifetime. Both of the theories of Erikson and
Hogan overlook the role of cognition in the development of moral judge-
ment. Kohlberg's theory incorporates elements of the theories of Erikson
and Hogan within it's framework: Erikson's third personality stage, in
which morality develops, is roughly analogous to Kohlberg's fourth moral
stage. According to Kohlberg, acceptable behavior consists of doing
one's duty and maintaining the social order in much the same fashion
as Erikson's principle of lam and order.
Hogan's moral theory i.. based on the assumption that all individuals
have a need for social approval. Kohlberg contends that this is the
primary orientation among stage three individuals in his cognitive-
developmental approach. In addition, two of Hogan's character
traits are correlated with Kohlberg's stares. Tsujimoto and Nardi
(cited in Rest, 1979b) found that there is a correlation of .27 between
Hogan's character trait of empathy and Kohlberg's stage 58 and a
correlation of .18 between Hogan's autonomy trait and Kohlberg's sixth
stage. While these are not large correlations, they do indicate some
commonalty between these theories.
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Hoffman (1970) observed that most research has investigated either
the cognitive determinants or emotional factors of moral development.
Alter reviewing the relevant research on moral development, he suggests
that a theory should include both cognitive and affective components.
Kohlberg's cognitive-development approach is ideal for conducting
research into the relationship between moral development and personal-
ity. His theory is both generally accepted and well researched. A
number of instruments have been developed using Kohlberg's theory in
order to measure moral development. Elements of other theories of
moral development can be found in Kohlberg's cognitive-developmental
approach. Finally, his theory can be used to predict a number of links
between personality and moral development. If one can show a definite
link between Kohlberg's thecry of moral development and personality,
then the evidence would suggest that morality is composed of both
personality and cognitive components. A failure to find this association
would then presume that moral development, as defined by Kohlberg, is
a largely cognitive process with no ties to personality.
The majority of the studies relating moral development and
personality can be divided into three types of investigations. The
first area of investigation involves the relationship between moral
development and longitudinally-stable constructs such as locus of
control, field Independence-field dependence, and intelligence
(Bloomberg, 1974; Bloomberg ard Soneson, l97; Janzen and Boersman,
197'; Lambert, DeJulio, and Cole, 197(; Mayshark, 1978; Ross 1978;
Valle and Koeske, 1974). A second area of research involves the
relationship between moral development and personality variables
generally associated with Khhlhere'n chrnitive-development approach
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such as conformity, autonomy, need for social approval, and abstractness
(O'Connor, 1971; Saltzstein, Diamond, and Belensky, 1972; Sullivan and
Quarter, 1972; Weber, 1974). Finally, a third group of researchers
has correlated Rest's Defining Issues Test (1974) with personality
inventories such as the California Personality Inventory and the Omnibus
Personality Inventory (Rest, 1979b).
The studies relating moral development to longitudinally stable
constructs have largely failed to show a clear relationship between them.
In a recent study, Ross (1978) investigated the interrelationships be-
tween moral development and the following constructs: locus of control,
creativity, field dependence-field independence and intelligence. She
found that with the exception of intelligence, none of the other measures
were correlated with moral development and concluded that moral develop-
ment tapped a cognitive ability independent of the other measures. She
reported a correlation of .30 between intelligence and moral development.
Kohlberg (1969) also reported correlations in the .30 to .50 range
between his Moral Judgement Scale and IQ. He concluded that subjects
scoring higher on IQ tests, which presumably indicate how subjects
compare with each other in speed of learning, in ability to think
abstractly, and ability to grasp complex relationships, would be further
along in the cognitive development of moral judgement. Moral development
and intelligence would seem to be related to the extent that similar
cognitive abilities are necessary to advance both in moral development
and in intelligence level.
Lambert, DeJulio, and Cole (1970 investigated the relationship
between locus of control (the extent to which an individual feels that
one's own actions will result in the attainment of pursuant goals) and
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moral development. An internal locus of control is the belief that one
is in control of one's actions and future consequences while an external
locus of control orientation is one in which an individual feels that
one's destiny is largely determined by chance and external forces. The
investigators found that locus of control is not significantly related
to moral development using Rotter's I-E Scale as a measure of locus of
control. A related study using Kohlberg's Moral Judgement Scale in con-
junction with Rotter's I-E Scale reported no significance between moral
development and locus of control (Janzen and Boersma, 1976). They con-
cluded that society needs more individuals with a higler level of moral
development, rather than individuals possessing an internal locus of
control as has been previously suggested.
The Defining Issues Test (Rest, 1979a) has been used in conjunction
with the I-E Scale to investigate the relationship between moral develop-
ment and locus of control (Bloomberg, 1974). He hypothesized that there
is a linear relationship between these constructs so that increasingly
higher stages of moral development will be associated with an increase
in internality. Bloomberg found that neither stage scores nor P
scores were linearly correlated with locus of control. He reported
that stage six individuals, however, were more internal than any of the
lower stages. This conclusion was based on only five subjects and is
relatively inconclusive.
Field independence-field dependence has also been investigated
in relationship to moral development. A field independent individual
possesses theability to attend to relevant stimuli and screen out
irrelevant stimuli. On the other hand, the field dependent individual
is constantly drawn toward distracting stimuli. Bloomberg and Soneson
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(1976) hypothesized that higher stages of moral development will be
associated with an internal locus of control and a field independent
orientation. They reported that stage five individuals possessed a
greater field independent orientation in relation to lower stages of
moral development based on a chi-square test of significance. The stage
five cell only contained 4 subjects and does not provide clear evidence
to support their hypothesis. In addition, they found that locus of
control was not related with moral development which is consistent
with previous findings.
Mayshark (1978) and Adelson (1975) reported that moral developmental
stages are not related to field independence az measured by the Croup
Embedded Figures Test (Witkins, 1966). The Group Embedded Figures
Test requires the subject to identify a figure which is hidden in a
maze of other geometric shapes. Adelson (1975) hypothesized that the
failure to find a relationship between moral development and field in-
dependence may be due to the different abilities required by these tasks.
The Embedded Figures task requires spatial-analytical abilities while
moral maturity is associated with verbal-analytical abilities.
As previously mentioned, the results of these studies w' 'id indicate
that moral development taps a cognitive ability which is largely inde-
pendent of longitudinally stable constructs with the exception of
intelligence. In addition, the studies which have found links between
a particular stage and field independence have been based upon very
small subject populations rendering them inconclusive.
Kohlberg (1958) hypothesizes that autonomy may be related to moral
reasoning. He distinguishes between life-style autonomy and moral auton-
omy in delineating this relationship. Life-style autonomy consists
mainly of resistance to social pressures to conform in matters of
personal taste and preference while moral autonomy is resistance
to social pressure to change one's moral orientation. Kohlberg contends
that stage two individuals should be autonomous in the sense of being
resistant tosocial pressure to conform (life-style autonomy) while stage
six individuals should exhibit moral autonomy.
Kohlberg hypothesizes that there is a relationship between conformity
and moral development. He feels that stage three individuals will exhibit
a high need for conformity in relation to those individuals operating at
the preconventional and postconventional levels. The need for social
approval comprises the major orientation in this stage and provides
the motivation for stage three individuals to conform. Stage four in-
dividuals will exhibit a high need for conformity although this is
specific to those members of society who are in positions of authority.
Saltzstein, Diamond, and Belensky (1972) used a group conformity
situation to determine the relationship betwen conformity and moral
development. Subjects participating in the group conformity situation
were placed in either one of two treatments: interdependent or
independent. In the interdependent treatment, subjects functioned as a
member of a group which had to reach a consensus while competing with
the other groups. The independent treatment required subjects to
compete as individuals against all other individuals. They reported a
curvilinear relationship between moral judGement level and the overall
frequency of conforming responses. Stage three individuals were more
likely to conform than those individuals operating at a higher or lower
stage of moral development. They interpreted this as a high need for
social approval which is consistent with Kohlberg's descriptive nomencla-
ture for stage three individuals.
Kanter (1975) used a number of different measures to investigate
the relationship between moral development and personality with an adult
offender population. Using the Marlowe Crowne Social Desirability Scale
(designed to measure the extent to which a subject is answering the way
he feels is socially correct), the Defining Issues Test (an objective
measure of moral development), and the
Inventory (a written format, objective
"normal" psychological characteristics
Lanyons Psychological Screening
instrument designed to measure
like alienation and affiliation),
he reported that stage three individuals exhibited a high need for social
desirability which he interpreted as a high need for social approval.
Both of these studies provide evidence which relates moral develop-
ment to conformity. One must note, however, that both studies may not
be able to be generalized to all conformity situations. The Kanter
study is specific to the prison population who served as subjects. In
the group conformity study, it is unclear whether the greater number of
conforming responses were the result of the group's desire to reach a
consensus quicker than the other group or for social approval. While
these studies may not present conclusive evidence linking conformity
and moral development, they provide a basis for formulating hypotheses
and conducting additional research.
A number of studies have related moral development to measures of
autonomy. Sullivan and Quarter 0971 found that postconventional
(stages 5 A () and preconventional (stages 1 A 2) subjects scored higher
than conventional (stages 3 & 4) subjects on a measure of autonomy using
the Omnibus Personality Inventory, an instrument which includes scales
assessing autonomy, complexity, impulse expression, practical outlook,
theoretical orientation and others. They reported that of the six stages,
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stage lw 1ividuals were highest on autonomy. The results of two
additional studies also indicated that stage two individuals exhibited
strong needs for autonomy (Haans, Stroud, and Holstein, 1973; Haans,
Smith, and Block, 1968). O'Connor (1971) found somewhat different
results using the Edwards Personal Preference Schedule (EPPS) autonomy
scale and Kohlberg's (1958) Moral Judgement Scale (WS) global scores.
The EPPS is a forced-choice objective instrument designed to provide
measures of a number of relatively independent "normal" personality
variables. He reported a rank ordering of global scores from high to low
as follows: 5-6, 3, 1-2, and 4.
The differences between these studies seem to indicate that the
results are not conclusive or consistent. They do suggest that individ-
uals operating at the conventional level of moral development,and stage
four in particular, can be associated with low autonomy scores. However,
further studies need to be conducted to confirm this.
O'Connor (1971) reported that abstractness is related to moral
development. He developed an abstractness orientation scale which
assesses the degree to which one's orientation is on an abstract level
as opposed to a concrete level. He reported a rank ordering of MJS
global scores from high to low as follows: 5 & 6, 1 & 2, 3 and 4. In
addition, he found that there was a significant difference between the
scores obtained by individuals in the fifth and sixth stages and the
scores of individuals in the fourth stage. Kohlberg (1969) discusses
abstractness when relating moral development to intelligence. He
hypothesizes that one's level to think abstractly (one of the attributes
that he feels is part of intelligence) will be positively correlated with
one's level of cognitive development in regards to moral development.
18
He hypothesizes that each successive level of woral development should
be associated with increases in the level of abstractness.
Rest (1979b) has surveyed a number of studies relating the Defining
Issues Test and various personality inventories. Blackner (cited in
Rest, 1979b) found that self-esteem, as measured by the Tennessee Self
Concept Scale, was not related to moral development. None of the
correlations between self concept and moral development were above .20
indicating that they are not related. Hartwick (cited in Rest, 1979b)
correlated the DIT with the California Personality Inventory using 98
undergraduate college students. He found a correlation of .48 between
the DIT and the variable Achievement via Independence and a correlation
of .48 with Intellectual Efficiency. Hartwick also reported correlations
of .32 with Psychological Mindedness, .33 with Responsibility, and .39
with Tolerance. Schomberg (cited in Rest, 1979b) correlated the Omnibus
Personality Inventory with the DIT and found significant positive
correlation at the .01 level with Complexity (.45), and Autonomy (.47),
and a significant negative correlation with Practical Outlook (-.51).
After reviewing these studies, Rest (1979b) concluded that moral develop-
ment is not related to personality in general, but rather to those
personality variables which involve cognitive processes. He suggests that
the variables Achievement via Independence, Intellectual Efficiency, and
Complexity may be viewed as related to general cognitive development.
The remaining variables all would seem necessary in order to make
principled moral judgements. He feels that while there is a link between
moral development and personality, morality and the DIT are strongly
related to cognitive processes. The results of these studies support
this conclusion.
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In general, the research relating moral development to personality
lends support to Kohlberg's cognitive developmental approach. Based on
the results of these studies, one can hypothesize that moral development
will be associated with both specific personality variables relating to
Kohlberg's moral stages or those variables involving cognitive
processes. However, many of the results of these studies are not
conclusive. The majority of the studies which reported positive or
negative correlations did not report whether the correlations were
significant. Without this information, one can not critically evaluate
the results. In addition, many of the studies used different indices
of moral development. Kohlberg alone has developed four different scor-
ing techniques for his Moral Judgement Scale. Rest has developed both
a stage score and a principled reasoning score for his Defining Issues
Test. Naturally, the results may vary depending on the scoring
technique employed. A further problem with much of the current
research is that some researchers correlate a measure of moral develop-
ment and a collection of penionality variahl(::; wilhout having a
theoretical basis to do so. Instead, they conduct research on a "lets
see what happens" basis. It is no small wonder that moral development
is usually not significantly related to these variables.
A number of instruments have been constructed in an attempt to
provide an assessment of moral judgement. In order to ascertain the
validity of his cognitive-developmental stage theory, Kohlberg (1958)
developed a moral judgement measure termed the Moral Judgement Scale (MJS).
The MJS is a structured projective test consisting of a series of stories
involving moral dilemmas to which the subject responds. The test is
presented in a verbal interview format with a series of questions
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following each dilemma. The subject is instructed to state his moral
resolution of the dilemma and,more importantly, reasons supporting this
moral judgement. The responses are scored for the structure of reasoning
(justification of resolution) and for consistency of the responses
across the various dilemmas.
The subject's results can be reported for each dilemma or the dominant
stage across dilemmas (global rating). The detailed scoring system is
more complex. Scores are assigned to each thought content unit, defined
as "all of a subject's utterances which, taken together, seem to express
a single moral idea" (Fodor, 1972, p. 258). These responses are as-
signed scores in accordance with an elaborate coding system based on
30 "general aspects of morality" (Kohlberg, 1963).
Kurtines and Greif (1974) have extensively reviewed the psychometric
properties of the MJS-. They reported a number of methodological diffi-
culties associated with the instrument. While the free response mode is
an advantage when assessing the subject's style of response, it introduces
material not comparable from subject to subject and allows for interviewer
and scorer bias. Kurtines and Greif reported that due to the complexity
of the scoring techniques and administration difficulties, there is
little standardization of either administration or scoring. In addition,
they could find no test-retest reliabilities, or any internal consistency
estimates in previous studies using the MJS. Rubin and Trotter (1977)
have since reported internal consistency estimates of .77, .73, and .82
for the first three of Kohlberg's dilemmas. Wilmoth and McFarland (1977)
reported interrater reliabilities of .(,8 and .58 for the first two MJS
dilemmas. The differences between these reliabilities in the two studies
indicate that the scoring ability of the raters affects the reliability
of the MJS because it does not have an objective scoring system.
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Many of the limitA,Ions of the M. have been avoided with the
development of the Defining Issues Test (Rest, Codor, Cooper, Masanz,
and Anderson, 1974). The DIT employs an objective written format as
opposed to a verbal interview format similar to the MJS. Subjects are
presented six dilemmas with 12 statements following each dilemma. The
subject's task is to rate the issue statements in terms of their per-
ceived importance in making a decision about the dilemma using a five
position likert scale: no importance, little importance, some importance,
much importance, and great importance. Following this, the subject ranks
the four issue statements which he considers are most relevant in
resolving the moral dilemma. Statements characteristic of stages two
through six are represented by two issue statements each, with the
remaining issue statements serving as nonsense items. Each subject is
assigned both a stage score (stage of moral reasoning most frequently
used) and a principled reasoning score (assessing the extent to which
the individual's level of moral development reflects usage of ethical
standards characteristic of stages 5 and (:). The principled reasoning
score (P score) is derived by doing the following: (a) give weights of
4, 3, 2, and 1 to the issues ranked first, second, third, and fourth,
respectively; (b) sum the weights attributed to the principled issues
(items keyed as stage 5 and over all six stories; (c) express the
results in terms of the percentage of weights attributed to the principled
stages. This number can range from 0 to 95 and is erpreteri as the
relative importance a subject gives to morally principled considerations
in making moral judgements.
Rest ct al. (1974) reported a test-retest correlation of .81 with
college students who completed the test and were retested after 2 months.
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Rest (1975), in a longitudinal study with adolescenis, reported a two-
year stability of .68 for the junior high group and .54 for those in-
dividuals graduating from high school. Panowitsch (1975) reported a
test-retest reliability of .89. Rest et al. (1974) also reported a
Chronbach's alpha of .77 for the index. Davidson and Robbins (cited
in Rest 1979b) found that alpha was also .77 in a sample of 1080 subjects.
The DIT is more reliable than the PUS because of its more objective
scoring procedure. The DIT appears to be a relatively stable and
interally consistent instrument well adapted for research purposes.
While both the MJS and the DIT have been developed from Kohlberg's
cognitive-developmental theory, there are a number of differences between
these instruments. As mentioned previously, the MJS uses a free response
mode, whereas the DIT presents the subject with a set of standardized
alternatives representing the scoring categories. While the free
response mode allows the examiner to discern the subject's mode of
thinking (reasons for the resolution), the disadvantages of this response
style are increased interviewer and scoring bias and lack of_standardia-
tion in administration and scoring.
Another difference between these instruments is that the DIT
consistently scores subjects' levels of moral reasoning approximately 1.5
stages higher than the MJS (Rest, 1975). Rest attributes this to the
different formats employed by the two instruments. He contends that the
DIT requires the individual to only recognize the various moral orienta-
tions,which is much easier than verbally producing them on the MJS.
Therefore, subjects will be able to recognize higher moral orientations
than they will be able to verbally produce. The DIT also offers greater
reliability and standization in administration and scoring. In addition,
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the DIT produces both stage scores and P scores,whereas the MJS only
produces stage scores.
Kurtines and Greif (1974) and Rest (1976, 1979b) have criticized
the dominant stage scoring method because these stage classifications
are not as distinct as they appear to be. In other words, the criterion
for classification in a specific stage is that over 50% of an individual's
responses can be classified at that stage. Individuals who exhibit 51%
to 100% of their responses at a particular stare will all be classified
the same although there may be a large difference in the extent to which
they use this stage of moral reasoning when solving moral dilemmas.
Rest (197r, 1979b) contends that P scores are better indicators of moral
development because they gauge the extent to which individuals utilize
postconventional moral reasoning by expressing this as a percentage of
the total responses. Rest's P score allows general comparisons between
conventional and principled reasoning. The preconventional reasoning
group is not an important consideration when interpreting P scores because
Rest has found that only a very small percentage of adults exhibit either
stage one or two moral reasoning. Rest (1979b) has established cutoff
points for dividing subjects into groups based on their P scores. By
using these cutoff points for all studies using these group divisions,
researchers will be able to compare studies with one another inasmuch as
the definitions of low and high will be constant across studies. The
Defining Issues Test and accompanying P scores provide an objective
measure of moral judgement which is comparable across studies. For
these reasons, they will both be used in this investigation.
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In addition to choosing a measure of mural judgement, one must choose
one or more instruments designed to assess personality traits which can
be used in conjunction with Kohlberg's cognitive developmental theory
and the Defining Issues Test. At this point, one must decide on which
variables to include in the investigation and whether to use separate
measures for each variable or opt for a multiple scale instrument. The
following variables will be used to ascertain the relationship between
moral development and personality: conformity, autonomy, analytical
thinking, need for approval, and abstractness. All of these variables
have been chosen because they can be theoretically related either to
Kohlberg's theory or general cognitive processes associated with making
moral judgements.
It was decided that a multiple scale inventory would be used instead
of separate measures lor each variable. Separate measures usually contain
more test items which increase reliability and are usually more indepen-
dent from one another than are multiple scale inventories. However,
separate measures require a great deal more time both to administer and
score. Due to the number of variables which will be included in this
investigation, some increased reliability and independence may have to
be sacrificed in order to use a multiple scale inventory which is much
easier and quicker to administer and score. An idea 7 personality in-
ventory would be both reliable and composed of relatively independent
scales which assess all or most of the variables to be included in this
study.
Of the multiple scale personality inventories, the Edwards Personal
Preference Scale fits all of these requirements (Edwards, 1959). Edwards
has reported an average split-half reliability of .76 and a test-retest
2:)
reliability coefficient averaro of .82 for his fifteen scales. He
also stated that the intercorrelations between the scales are quite low
indicating that the variables being measured by the EP PS are relatively
independent. The EP PS contains scales which assess conformity (deference),
autonomy, analytical thinking (intraception), and need for approval and
acceptance (affiliation). The Abstract Orientation Scale (O'Connor, 1971)
will be administered to assess abstractness.
Many of the studies relating moral development to personality have
used Kohlberg's stage scoring system rather than Rest's P score system.
While these scoring systems are different, predictions based on Kohlberg's
moral stages can be used to relate P score levels and personality. Rest
(1979b) has established cutoff points for dividing P scores into one of
the following three groups based on his experience with the Defining
Issues Test: low principled reasoning group (0 to 27 P score), medium
principled reasoning group (2e to 41 P score), and the high principled
reasoning group (42 and up P score).
The low group largely exhibits conventional moral reasoning which
is analogous to Kohlberg's stages three and four. Individuals within
this group respond to moral dilemmas at least 73% of the time with con-
ventional level reasoning. This group should have both a high need for
conformity and high need for social approval characteristic of the
need structure of stage three and four individuals. By contrast,
individuals in the high principled reasoning group operate from a post-
conventional level of moral reasoning characteristic of stages five and
six. They make moral judgments based on social utility and ethical
considerations after analyzinr all aspects of the moral dilemma rather
than based on peer pressure or approval. Therefore, the high group should
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have law needs for conformity and social approval. In addition, the high
group should have a high need for autonomy whereas the low group should
have a low need for autonomy. The medium principled reasoning group pre-
dominantly uses conventional moral reasoning although a number of their
responses may be at the principled level of moral reasoning. Therefore,
individuals within this group should exhibit some personality needs
characteristic of both the conventional and principled levels of moral
development. As a result, the medium group should exhibit moderate needs
for conformity, social approval and autonomy.
Kohlberg (1969) hypothesized that analytical ability and abstract
thinking was positively correlated to cognitive development. He also
suggested that each successive moral stage represented a higher level of
cognitive development. As an individual's principled reasoning increases,
as measured by increases in P scores on the Defining Issues Test, the use
of abstract and analytical reasoning should also increase. This should
produce a relationship between P scores and the selected personality
needs with the high group being highest on these variables and the low
group being lowest on them. As before, the medium group should show
moderate needs for both analytical and abstract thinking.
In order to verify the proposed relationships between variables,
two principled reasoning levels and the selected personality variables,
two questions need to be resolved. The first question to be answered
is whether the individuals within the three groups will exhibit different
personality needs based on their level of moral development. To answer
this, one need only compare the means for each group on the five person-
ality variables and determine whether the differences are significant in
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the predicted directions. The second issue t
o be answered is whether
these variables can be combined in a way that will
discriminate between the three groups. This would 
determine whether the
groups are statistically different from one another on a 
collection of
variables which measure characteristics on which the grou
ps are expected
to differ. In addition to confirming the proposed lin
ks between moral
development and personality, these variables could be 
used to predict
one's level of moral development based on one's personali
ty needs.
The specific hypotheses to be investigated are as foll
ows:
1. Those individuals in the low principled reasoning 
group will be
significantly lower on measures of autonomy, intraceptio
n, and
abstractness and significantly higher on deference and 
affiliation
in comparison to those individuals in the high principled
 reasoning
group.
2. The high principled reasoning group will be significa
ntly higher
on measures of intraception and abs+ractness when compared wit
h
the medium principled reasoning group.
3. Those individuals in the medium principled reasoning gr
oup will
be significantly higher than the low principled reasoning groups 
on
measures of intraception and abstractness.
4. The discriminant analysis procedure will combine the variables to
produce one or more discriminate functions which will contain
statistically significant discrimination power.
Method
Subjects
The sample consisted of 110 college students enrolled in upper level
psychology classes at Western Kentucky University. There were 80 females
and 30 males in the sample with a mean age of 22.5. Those subjects who
volunteered were given credit toward their final grade as an incentive
to participate.
The membership in the three moral reasoning groups is as follows:
23 subjects were placed in the low principled reasoning group (21%), 43
were placed in the medium principled reasoning group (39%), and 44 were
placed in the high principled reasoning group (40%). The average P
score for the sample population was 38.'.
Procedure
Each subject was told that data were being collected for a master's
thesis investigating the relationship between personality and one's views
on selected social issues. The test battery was administered in group
form over two one-hour class periods. During the first period, subjects
completed the Edward Personal Preference Schedule and the Abstract
Orientation Scale. The average length of time needed to complete both
of these instruments was about 45 minutes. During the second period,
students completed the Defining Issues Test (entitled the Opinion About
Social Problems Test). This instrument requires about an hour to complete.
Appropriate instructions preceded the various instruments according to
the standardized format outlined in the manuals for both the DIT and the
EPPS (See Appendix A). Two weeks after the second testing period, sub-
jects were given profiles of their test results in order to provide them
with adequate feedback. The procedure:. 11:,e1 to score the three instruments




The subjects were placed into either the low, medium or high principled
reasoning groups based on their P scores on the Defining Issues Test using
Rest's (1979b) cutoff points. Those individuals with a P score ranging
from 0 to 27 were placed in the low principled reasoning group. Subjects
with a P score ranging from 28 to 41 were placed in the medium principled
reasoning group. Finally, those individuals with P scores of 42 and above
were placed in the high principled reasoning group. Group means for all
subjects within a particular group were then computed for each of the per-
sonality variables. The group means of the subjects in each of the three
principled reasoning groups were compared to determine whether these
groups were significantly different from one another on the personality
variables. These same three groups were also used for the discriminant
analysis procedure in order to determine whether the discriminant functions
were able to discriminate between the principled reasoning groups.
Analysis
During the course of this investigation, two separate analyses were
conducted. In order to determine whether subjects within the three
principled reasoning groups are significantly different from one another
on any of the five variables, one-way analyses of variance were performed
on each set of group means. In addition, separate S tests (Scheffe% 1958)
were conducted on each set of group means with a significant F ratio.
Scheff's S test was used for two reasons. The S test allows the
researcher to compare groups which have unequal numbers of subjects.
Because the S test is conservative, one can conduct more than one S
test on the same set of subjects without substantially violating the
principle of independency of testing. Three separate S tests were
conducted on the group means for each personality variable which has a
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significantF-ratio. This determined which of the three possible pairings
of two group means were significantly different from one another for that
variable.
In addition to the analysis of variance procedure, the three princi-
pled reasoning groups were evaluated using a discriminant analysis
procedure. The variables used in this investigation were selected
because they measure characteristics on which the three groups should
differ. The function of the discriminant anlysis was to combine these
variables in some fashion which made the groups as statistically distinct
as possible. The discriminant analysis combined the discriminating variables
into functions which formed dimensions on which the groups differed. The
discriminant analysis procedure (Klecka, 1975) provided both an analysis
aspect and a classification aspect. The analysis aspect provided
statistical tests for measuring the success with which the variables dis-
criminated between the principled reasoning groups when combined into
discriminant functions. The classification aspect was used to test the
effectiveness of the derived functions by classifying those members of
the three principled reasoning groups to see how many of the members
were correctly classified using the discriminant functions. The classi-
fication aspects can also be used to classify subjects of unknown ,-roup
memberships into one of the three groups based on their personality
variables scores.
In the discriminant analysis, a stepwise procedure was used in order
to select those personality variables which best discriminated among
the three principled reasoning groups. This procedure began by selecting
the variable which best discriminated among the three groups when each
variable was evaluated individually. The second variable selected was
the variable which when combined with the first variable be
st improved
the discriminating power of the function. The third and subseq
uent
variables were selected in the order in which they contributed to furth
er
discrimination when combined with previously selected variables. At each
step, variables previously selected may be removed if they reduce the
overall discrimination power of the function when combined with mo
re
recently selected variables. The stepwise procedure continued until
all of the variables were either included in the analysis or did n
ot
contribute to further discrimination. The remainder of the discrimina
nt
analysis procedure was performed only on those variables which were
selected for inclusion in the discriminant functions.
The criterion used to determine which of the variables were included
in the discriminant analysis was Rao's V. Rao's V is a generalized
distance measure which is appropriate when one is interested in the
overall separation of the groups irregardless of the proximity of any
two groups to one another. With the exception of the Wilks' lambda para-
meter, parameters which are available in the discriminant analysis pro
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cedure are largely concerned with maximizing the distance between the
two closest groups rather than the overall separation of the groups as
is the case with Rao's V. With these other parameters variables may be
included which not only help separate the two closest groups tut also
decrease the distance between other groups. With Rao's V only those
variables which increase the change in V when added to previously
selected variables are included. Therefore, this parameter maximally
separates the groups according to total overall distance irregardless of
the positions of any particular groups in relation to one another. In
addition, the Rao's V parameter can he testecl for statistical significance
using a chi-square distribution with one devree of freedom. By using the
chi-square distribution, one can evaluate the importance of the change in
V attributable to each of the variables. This can be important when one
has a number of variables which offer only minimal increases in discrim-
ination.
As previously mentioned, the discriminant analysis can be used to
predict the likely group membership of a subject when the only information
known was the subject's scores on the discriminating variables. In addition,
by classifying the subjects which were used to form the derived functions
and comparing the predicted group memberships with the actual group
memberships, one can test the adequacy of the derived functions by
observing the proportion of correct classifications. Subjects were
assigned to thevroups for which they had the greatest probability of
membership.
- Results
The group means and standard deviations for each of the five
personality variables are presented in table 2. The results of the
analyses of variance which were performed on each of the personality
variables are presented in table 3. Deference, autonomy, intraception,
and abstractness were significant at the .01 level while affiliation was
not significant.
In order to determine whether the three groups exhibited homogeneity
of variance on the analyses of variance, Bartlett's test for several
groupr with unequal n's (1937) was performed on each of the four signifi-
cant variables. The results of the tests on deference (X2 1.493), autonomy
(X2 .5135), intraception (Y2 .(010), and abstractness (X2=3.378) are all




Principled Reasoning Group Means and Standard Deviations
for each of the Personality Variables
Variables Principled Reasoning Groups
Low Medium High
Deference Mean (3.73913 4 ., 04(5 36.70455
Standard
Deviation 28.38889 31.86739 26.47033
Autonomy Mean 54.95(52 45.48837 63.27273
Standard
Deviation 27.97479 25.108(9 24.60891
Affiliation Mean 52.39130 46.1(279 53.11364
Standard
Deviation 33.85(30 29.25742 25.65533
Intraception Mean 45.00000 42.51163 62.54545
Standard
Deviation 30.10738 2(.35958 28.64494
Abstractness Mean 37.47826 49.79070 64.97727
Standard
Deviation 25.36259 25.3(360 29.81141
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Table -3
Analysis of Variance Comparisons Between Principled
Reasoning Groups on each of the Personality Variables
Variable Source df MS F
Deference Groups 2 5524.72 6.53*
Error 107 84(.167
Autonomy Groups 2 3441.17 5.28*
Error 107 651.74
Affiliation Groups 2 592.30 .71
Error 107 83(.18
Intraception Groups 2 4938.09 6.27*
Error 107 788.06
Abstractness Groups 2 6143.43 8.3(*
Error 107 734.45
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variance. Post-hoc comparisons of the dilferences between the group
means were made using Scheffe's S test. The difference between the low
group mean and the high group mean was significant at the .05 level on
deference and abstractness. The difference between the medium group
mean and the high group mean was significant at the .05 level on intra-
ception, autonomy, and abstractness. N ne of the differences between the
low and medium groups were significant. The S test comparisons are
presented in table 4.
The variables were entered into the discriminant analysis using the
stepwise procedure. Abstractness was the first variable to be included
in the analysis because it best discriminated between the three groups
when each of the variables were evaluated separately. Abstractness had
a change in Rao's V from 0 to 16.5( which is significant at the .001
level. Deference was the second variable entered in the analysis. It
changed in V from 16.56 to 28.62 (12.06) which is significant at
the .002 level. Autonomy was entered third with a change in V of 10.23
from 28.(2 to 38.85 which is significant at the .00( level. Intraception
was the fourth variable to be included in the analysis with an associated
change in V of 7.25 from 38.85 to 4(.10 which was significant at the .027
level. Affiliation entered the analysis last with a change in V of 3.33
from 4(.10 to 49.43 which was not significant.
The discriminant analysis produced two separate discriminant functions.
The first function accounted for approximately 78% of the variance existing
in the discriminating variables with an associated eigenvalue of .35.
The second function accounted for 22% of the variance in the discriminat-
ing variables with an eigenvalue of .10. Eigenvalues are roots derived
from the equations used to determine the discriminant functions. By
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Table 4
Scheffe Test Comparisons Between Personality
Score Means for the Principled Reasoning Groups
Variable Principled Group Mean Differences
Low/Med Low/High Med/High
Deference 17.14 27.o4* 9.9
Autonomy 9.47 8.31 17.78*
Affiliation
Intraception 2.49 17.55 20.04*




expressing these eigenvalues as percentages of the total sum of eigenvalues,
one can assess the relative importance of each of the functions. The
second function has only one-fourth the discriminating power of the first
function.
The canonical correlation for each of the discriminant functions can
also be used to evaluate the function's ability to discriminate between
the groups. The canonical correlations are associated with the eigenvalues
and represent how closely the discriminant functions are related to the
set of dummy variables which comprise the canonical variate that defines
the group memberships. By squaring these correlations, one can determine
the proportion of variance in the discriminant functions explained by
the groups. The groups accounted for .2(fIg of the variance in function one
and 9% of the variance in function two. Together the groups accounted
for 35% of the variance present in the discriminant functions. Therefore,
65% of the variance present in the functions was due to causes unrelated
to the variance produced by the principled reasoning groups. In spite
of this, both discriminant functions were found to contain
significant discriminating power using Wilks' lambda. Wilks' lambda
tests the significance of discriminating information existing in a
function which is not already accounted for by earlier functions. Lambda
is an inverse measure of the discriminating power in the personality
variables which have not been accounted for by previous discriminant
functions. Therefore as lambda increases, there is less information
remaining. The lambda statistic was then transformed into a chi-square
statistic by the discriminant analysis procedure in order to test for
significance. Before either of the functions were removed, Wilks'
lambda was .(67 which corresponds to a chi-square distribution of 42.486
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with 10 derrees of freedom. This is sirnificant at the .001 level.
After the first function was removed, lambda increased to .907. This
corresponds to a chi-square distribution
freedom which is significant at the .037
Both of the functions are comprised
of 10.216 with Al. degrees of
level.
of discriminant function
coefficients which are associated with each of discriminating variables.
These coefficients represent the relative contributions of the variables
to the functions. The signs in frontof the coefficient merely denote
whether the variables are making positive or negative contributions.
Remember, of course, that the functions are arranged in order of decreas-
ing importance so that the contributions of the variables to the first
function are more meaningful than the contributions on the second function.
The coefficients which correspond with the discriminating variables
on the first function are as follows in decreasing order: Abstractness
.579, deference + .455, intraception - .401, autonomy - .384, and
affiliation - .182. This indicates that abstractness makes the largest
contribution the the discriminating Dower on the first function of all
of the variables. In addition, abstractness can be interpreted as being
about one and a half
the first function.
contributions to the
times as important as intraception, for example, on
Deference, intraception, and autonomy all make large
first function. Affiliation is relatively unimportant
on the first function. The coefficients which correspond with the dis-
criminating variables on the second function are as follows in decreasing
order: Autonomy - .688, deference - .5(1, affiliation - .454, abstract-
ness + .291, and intraception - .256. On the second function, autonomy
makes the largest contribution while deference and affiliation make
smaller but more important contributions. Abstractness and intraception do
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not make important contributions to the discriminating power of the
second function in comparison to the other variables. These coefficients
are important because they identify the dominant variables and character-
istics which comprise both of the functions. On the first function,
which accounted for 78% of the variance, abstractness, intraception,
and autonomy make strong negative contributions of discriminating power
while deference makes a strong positive contribution. These variables
account for the majority of the discriminating power present in both of
the functions and are very important variables for this investigation.
They can be grouped under a principled reasoning (abstractness, intracep-
tion, and autonomy) versus conventional reasoning (deference) continuum.
Abstractness, intraception, and autonomy all contain characteristics
which are needed in order to make principled moral judgements while
deference measures the conforming orientation which comprises the con-
ventional level of moral development.
The second function appears to be comprised of those variables which
are linked with Kohlberg's moral development (affiliation, autonomy, and
deference) and can be named the Kohlbergian variables function. Both of
the variables which are linked to general cognitive processes (abstractness
and intraception) make relatively small contributions on this function.
While this function contributes only about one fourth as much discrimina-
tion power as the first function, there is a significant amount of
discrimination power in this function.
In order to better understand the effect of the discriminant functions
on separating the principled reasoning groups, one needs to examine the
means for the groups on each function. By averaging the discriminant
scores for each subject within a particular group on one of the functions,
we arrive at the group mean on that reopclive tunction. For a single
group, the means on all of the functions are referred to as the group
centroid. A comparison of the group means on each function tells one how
far apart the groups are along that dimension. The group centroids are
presented in standard form in Figure 1.
A comparison of the distances between the three group means on the
first discriminant functions indicated that the variables which comprise
this function primarily separated the high principled reasoning group
from the other two groups. The distance between the low and medium group
means was small when compared to the distances between the high group
and either the low or medium group means. Therefore, the variables
important in the first function :as indicated by the discriminant function
coefficients (abstractness, intraception, autonomy, and deference), in
conjunction with one another, best discriminate the high principled
reasoning group from the low and medium principled reasoning groups.
A comparison of the Oistances between the group means on the second
functions reveals that this function primarily:,eparaied the low principled
reasoning group from the medium principled group. The distances between
the high group and both the low and medium groups were approximately
equal. Therefore, those variables that are important on the second
function (autonomy, deference, and affiliation) primarily discriminated
between the low principled reasoning group and the medium principled
reasoning group with some discrimination between the high principled
reasoning group and the low and medium groups.
After the functions were derived, the subjects u3ed to form these
functions were classified into one of the three principled reasoning
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group memberships based on the discriminant functions were compared to
their actual group memberships in order to evaluate the effectiveness
of the derived functions. The results of this classification procedure
are presented in table 5. The functions correctly classified (0.9%
of group one individuals, 53.5% of group two individuals, and ()3.6%
of group three individuals. The overall percentage of correctly
classified subjects was 59%. One can expect 33% of the subjects to be
correctly classified based on chance. The functions correctly classified
26% more subjects than one would expect to classify without the use of
the functions. The factors which probably contributed to the 41%
overall misclassifications will be elaborated upon in the discussion
section.
Discussion
All of the hypotheses except the third hypothesis were at least
partially support based on the results of this investigation. At least
two of the three group means were significantly different from one another
on four of the five personality variables. In addition, the discriminant
analysis procedure was able to both produce two functions with significant
discrimination power and correctly classify 59% of the subjects into their
correct principled reasoning group based solely on their personality scores.
As predicted, individuals in the low group were significantly higher
on deference and significantly lower on abstractness in comparison with
the high group based on the results of the Scheffe test. There were also
large differences between the low and high groups on autonomy and intra-
ception in the predicted direction although they were not significant.
None of the differences on autonomy were significant for any of the




Actual Versus Predicted Principled Reasoning Group
Memberships Based on the Discriminant Functions
Actual Group No. of Cases Predicted Group Membership
Low Medium High
Low 23 14 3
60.9% 26.1% 13.0%
Medium 43 8 23 12
18.6% 53.5% 27.9%
High 44 8 8 28
18.2% 18.2%
Percent of subjects correctly classified 59.09%
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lower on abstractness and int.,rception in comvirison in the high group
as predicted. Thc medium group was also significantly lower than the
high group on autonomy.
The Scheffe group comparison results did not support the third
hypothesis concerning the relationship between the low and medium
principled reasoning groups. While the medium group was higher than
the low group on the measure of abstractness, the difference was not
significant- None of the other variables produced significant differences
between the low and medium group means. The failure of the variables to
produce significant differences between the low and medium groups was
probably due to two factors. The established cutoff point between the
two groups did not separate the subjects into distinct and different
groups. In addition, the personality variables were not sensitive to any
differences which were present between the low and medium groups. Instead,
the variables which produced significant results were most sensitive to
differences betwe,m either the low and high groups or the medium and
high groups.
One of the assumptions underlying the proposed hypotheses was that
increases in the degree of principled reasoning used by the subjects
would be generally associated with increases in the levels of intraception,
autonomy, and abstractness and decreases in the levels of deference and
affiliation exhibited by the subjects. This trend held true for both
the deference and abstractness variables although the differences
between the low and medium groups were not significant. However, the
medium groups were lower in mean percentile score than the low grcilps
for both autonomy and interception indicating that for these two variables
increases in their levels were not associated with increases in principled
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reasoning. In fact, none of the differences between the personality
variable means for the low and medium groups were significantly
different from one another indicating that the two groups were composed
of individuals who were similar to one another and who both primarily
utilize conventional reasoning. Since the low and medium groups are
similar, they can be considered to be in fact one large
group rather than two distinct groups as was first thought. Therefore,
if we assume this to be the case, then there are only the high group
comprised of individuals relying heavily on principled reasoning and the
conventional reasoning group composed of individuals in the low and
medium groups. Since four of the five personality variables produced
significant differences between the high group and either the low or
medium groups, the assumption previously mentioned would generally be
true. The results would indicate that using this two group schema,
increases in the degree of principled reasoning are associated with
increases in the levels of intraception, autonomy, and abstractness,
and a decrease in the level of deference. In addition, the variables
were primarily sensitive to differences between the high group repre-
senting principled reasoning and the low and middle groups representing
conventional reasoning.
The results of the discriminant analysis also tend to support the
notion that there were really only two principled reasoning groups in-
stead of the three which were proposed in this investigation. By examin-
ing the group meats for a particular discriminant function, one can
determine how far the group are from one another along that dimension.
The first discriminant function primarily discriminated between the high
group and the other two groups. The second discriminant function largely
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discriminated between the low and medium groups with some discrimination
between the high group and the low and medium groups. It should be
remembered that the second function contains only about one fourth of
the discriminating power of the first function. Therefore, while the
overall goal of the discriminant analysis was to find a combination of
variables which would separate the three groups from one another, the
principle result was to separate the high group from the remaining low
and medium groups.
Those variables which produced significant differences on the
analyses of variance were also important on the discriminant analysis.
Abstractness, deference,intraception, and autonomy all made large con-
tributions to the first functidn. Deference, and autonomy also make
large contributions on the second function. The results of both the
discriminant analysis and the analyses of variance would indicate that
these four variables are definitely related to moral development as
measured by the Defining Issues Test. Each of these variables have been
stronglyassociatedwith aspects of either conventional or principled
reasoning. The results for deference and to a lesser degree, autonomy,
provide support for Kohlberg's (1958) cognitive developmental approach.
Deference can be related to conventional reasoning while increased
autonomy is associated with principled reasoning. In addition, they
concur with previous studies conducted with these variables (O'Connor
1971; Saltzstein, Diamond, and Belensky, 1972; Sullivan and Quarter, 1972).
The results on abstractness and intraception indicate that both
of these cognitively oriented personality variables can be associated with
increases in principled reasoning. This evidence supports Rest's (1979b)
contention that of the studies he has reviewed, moral development was
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associated with those personality characteristics that incorporate
cognitive processes. Rest concluded that moral development was more
closely related to cognitive processes than to personality characteristics.
The fact that the discriminant functions only accounted for a third of
the variance found within the three groups would surely indicate that
personality and morality are not analogous constructs. Indeed, morality
may be a relatively distinct construct which interfaces with personality
only in those areas where there is strong theoretical link to either
principled reasoning or to conventional reasoning based on Kohlberg's
cognitive development theory.
The present investigation has contributed to the research on moral
development in a number of ways. This investigation is one of only a
few studies to utilize a discriminant analysis procedure in order to
evaluate the relationship between personality and morality. Many of the
previous studies have simply reported a few correlations between certain
personality traits and a measure of moral development without a theoretical
rationale for doing so. In addition, previous studies have reported
correlations using stage scores or an overall P score average for all
subjects rather than the three P score groups similar to the present
study. By using different levels of principled reasoning, one is able
to discern the interrelationships between various levels of principled
reasoning and personality. A correlation based on an overall P score
average is too general a measure in order to determine whether personality
variables are associated with morality. A correlation only informs one
as to whether principled reasoning is generally related to personality
rather than delineating the specific relationship as does the analysis
of variance in conjunction with the discriminant analysis procedure.
Certainly tq 1 the analp;is of variance and the discriminant analysis
imply causality upon which predictions can be based.
The present investigation has supplied support for both Kohlberg's
(1958) cognitive developmental theory and Rest's (1979b) contention that
morality is strongly related to cognitive processes. A number of
questions remain, however. Some of the questions relate to the present
investigation while others have not yet been addressed by any research
in the area. Initially one would want to know whether the results of
this investigation can be successfully replicated. If this is the case,
then additional research needs to be directed toward the relationship
between personality and morality. While the three principled reasoning
groups were divided based on the recommendations by Rest (1979a), other
divisions could also be used to see whether any differences occur. The
results of the present investigation indicate that the low and medium
groups were composed of individuals with similar personality needs.
Therefore, there were only two groups instead of three groups based on
the personality variables used in this study. One interesting division
of groups would be using 50 as the cutting score on the P score scale
to see whether there would be differences between individuals operating
at the conventional morality level and those individuals operating at
the principled reasoning level. In addition, there may be other variables
which are better related to moral development than those used in this
investigation.
Rest (1979a) has noted a number of factors which influence one's moral
development level. Some of these include age, socioeconomic status,
level of education, religious affiliation and 114. Additional studies
need to be performed with different populations to establish whether the
results which were found using college students are reneralizable
to other populations. It is interesting to note that Rest (1979a)
found that sex differences were not a factor in determining moral
development.
Another possible area of investigation is whether variables such
as deference and abstractness will show developmental trends similar to
those of moral development. Since both deference and abstractness are
related to moral development, they may change as one's level of moral
reasoning also changes. This may be especially true for abstractness
as it is also related to cognitive processes like IQ which also show
developmental trends.
The results of this investigation provide a strong basis for
conducting further research. There seems to be support for both Kohlberg's
cognitive developmental approach and Rest's cognitive approach to morality.
Both of these approaches seem to be good theoretical orientations to employ





The following instructions were discussed before administering the Defining
Issues Tests
- We are interested in finding out what student's opinions are about controver-
sial social issues.
- Hease consider each item carefully and answer all of the questions by pacing
yourself so that you finish in an hoar.
- Every story has twelve issues. After readink; the story, read each item or issue
at the end of the story and rate it in importance. After rating each item indi-
vidually, then consider the set of 12 items and rank the four most important items.
- Note that there is a sample problem to practice on.
- In this sample case, items 4 and item 6 do not make sense and should be marked
as "no importance." All other items such as these should be rated low.
- If you do not understand a word, T will give you a dictionary definition of
the word. Otherwise you will have to make your best judgement.
- The items should be ranked and rated in terms of how important that issue is in
making a moral decision. 3ome issues may be very important, but you should ask
yourself whether the decision should rest on that issue.
The following instructions were given before administering the EPPS and the
Abstract Orientati)n
Jter you receive a booklet and answer sheet, please read the directions on the
cover.
- demember that you should read and answer every question. 3ome of the choices may
be difficult to make, but you should choose between them.
- The test takes approximately 40 minutes to finish. After you complete this test,
please complete the Abstract Orientation ;;cale.
- For each statement, circle the letter which motA closely fits your degree of
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Agreement or disagreement wit. the .itatement.
- At the end of the hour, please turn in all tests and answer sheets.
- Two weeks from now I will give each of your a report on your test results




OPINIONS ABOUT SOCIAL PROBLEM
This questionnaire is aimed at understanding how people think about social
problems. Different people often have different opinions about questions of right
and wrong. There are no "right" answers in the way that there are right answers
to math problems. We would like you to tell us what you think about several pro-
blem stories. The papers will be fed to a computer to find the average for the
whole group, and no one will see your individual answers.
Please give us the following information:
Name female
Age  Class and period male
School
In this questionnaire you will be asked to give your opinions about several
stories. Here is a story as an example. Read it, then turn to the next page.
Frank Jones has been thinking about buying a car. He is married, has two
small children and earns an average income. The car he buys will be his family's
only car. It will be used mostly to get to work and drive around town, but some-
times for vacation trips also. In trying to decide what car to buy, Frank Jones
realized that there were a lot of questions to consider. On the next page there
is a list of some of these questions.
If you were Frank Jones, how important would each of these questions be in
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1. Whether the car dealer was in the same block as
where Frank lives.
2. Would a used car be more economical in the long run
than a new car.
3. Whether the color was green, Frank's favorite color.
4. Whether the cubic inch displacement was at least 200.
5. Would a large, roomy car be better than a compact car.
6. Whether the front connibilies were differential.
From the list of questions above, select the most important one of the whole group.
Put the number of the most important question on the top line below. Do likewise
for your 2nd, 3rd, and 4th most important choices.
Most important
Second most important —2 --
Third most important 3
Fourth most important 1
)4
HEINZ AND THE DRUG
In Europe a woman was near death from a special kind of cancer. There was one
drug that the doctors thought might save her. It was a form of radium that a
druggist in the same town had recently discovered. The drug was expensive to
make, but the druggist was charging ten times what the drug cost to make. He
paid $200 for the radium and charged $2000 for a small dose of the drug. The
sick woman's husband, Heinz, went to everyone he knew to borrow the money, but
he could only get together about $1000, which is half of what it cost. He told
the druggist that his wife was dying, and asked him to sell it cheaper or let
him pay later. But the druggist said, "No, I discovered the drug and I'm going
to make money from it." So Heinz got desperate and began to think about breaking
into the man's store to steal the drug for his wife.
Should Heinz steal the drug? (Check one)
Should steal it
Can't decide
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HEINZ STORY
On the left hand side of the page check
one of the spaces by each question to
indicate its importance.
1. Whether a community's laws are going to be upheld.
2. Isn't it only natural for a loving husband to care
so much for his wife that he'd steal?
3. Is Heinz willing to risk getting shot as a burglar
or going to jail for the chance that stealing the
drug might help?
4. Whether Heinz is a professional wrestler, or has
considerable influence with professional wrestlers.
5. Whether Heinz is stealing for himself or doing this
solely to help someone else.
6. Whether the druggist's rights to his invention have
to be respected.
7. Whether the essence of living is more encompassing
than the termination of dying, socially and indi-
vidually.
8. What values are going to be the basis for governing
how people act towards each other.
9. Whether the druggist is going to be allowed to
hide behind a worthless law which only protects
the rich anyhow.
10. Whether the law in this case is getting in the way
of the mosi basic claim of any member of society.
11. Whether the druggist deserves to be robbed for
being so greedy and cruel.
12. Would stealing in such a case bring about more
total good for the whole society or not.






At Harvard University a group of students, called the Students for a Demo-
cratic Society (SDS), believe that the University should not have an army ROTC
program. SDS students are against the war in Viet Nam, and the army training pro-
gram helps send men to fight in Viet Nam. The SDS students demanded that Harvard
end the army ROTC training program as a university course. This would mean that
Harvard students could not get army training as part of their regular course work
and not get credit for it towards their degrees.
Agreeing with the SDS students, the Harvard professors voted to end the ROTC
program as a university course. But the President of the University stated that
he wanted to keep the army program on campus as a course. The SDS students felt
that the President was not going to pay attention to the faculty vote or to their
demands.
So, one day last April, two, hundred SDS students walked into the university's
administration building, and told everyone else to get out. They said they were
doing this to force Harvard to get rid of the army training program as a course.
Should the students havP taken crier the administration building? (Check one)
Yes, they should take it over
Can't decide
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STUDENT TAKE-OVER
1. Are the students doing this to really help other
people or are they doing it just for kicks.
2. Do the students have any right to take over property
that doesn't belong to them.
3. Do the students realize that they might be arrested
and fined, and even expelled from school.
4. Would taking over the building in the long run
benefit more people to a greater extent.
5. Whether the president stayed within the limits of
his authority in ignoring the faculty vote.
6. Will the takeover anger the public and give all
students a bad name.
7. Is taking over a building consistent with principles
of justice.
8. Would allowing one student take-over encourage many
other student take-overs.
9. Did the president bring this misunderstanding on
himself by being so unreasonable and uncooperative.
10. Whether running the university ought to be in the
hands of a few administrators or in the hands of
all the people.
11. Are the students following principles which they
believe are above the law.
12. Whether or not university decisions ought to be
respected by students.






A man had been sentenced to prison for 10 years. After one year, however,
he escaped from prison, moved to a new area of the country, and took on the name
of Thompson. For 8 years he worked hard, and gradually he saved enough money to
buy his own business. He was fair to his customers, gave his employees top wages,
and gave most of his own profits to charity. Then one day Mrs. Jones, an old
neighb )r, recognized him as the man who had escaped from prison 8 years before,
and whom the police had been looking for.
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1. Hasn't Mt. Thompson been good enough for such a
long time to prove he isn't a bad person?
2. Everytime someone escapes punishment for a crime,
doesn't that just cvrourage more crime?
3. Wouldn't we be better off without prisons and the
oppression of our legal system?
4. Has Mr. Thompson really paid his debt to society?
5. Would society be failing what Mr. Thompson should
fairly expect?
6. What benefits would prisons be apart from society,
especially for a charitable man?
7. How could anyone be so cruel and heartless as to
send Mr. Thompson to prison?
8. Would it be fair to all the prisoners who had to
serve out their full sentences if Mr. Thompson was
let off?
9. Was Mrs. Jones a good friend of Mr. Thompson?
10. Wouldn't it be a citizen's duty to report an escaped
crininal, regardless of the circumstances?
11. How would the will of the people and the public
good best be served?
12. Would going to prison do any good for Mr. Thompson
Or protect anybody?







A lady was dying of cancer which could not be cured and she had only about
six months to live. She was in terrible pain, but she was so weak that a good
dose of pain-killer like morphine would make her die sooner. She was delirious
and almost crazy with pain, and in her calm periods, she would ask the doctor
to give her enough morphine to kill her. She said she couldn't stand the pain
and that she was going to die in a few months anyway.
What should the doctor do? (Check one)
He should give the lady an overdose that will
make her die
Can't decide



































1. Whether the woman's family is in favor of giving
her the overdose or not.
2. Is the doctor obligated by the same laws as every-
body else if giving an overdose would be the same
as killing her.
3. Whether people would be much better off without
society regimenting their lives and even their deaths.
4. Whether the doctor could make it appear like an
accident.
5. Does the state have the right to force continued
existence on those who don't want to live.
6. What is the value of death prior to society's per-
spective on personal values.
7. Whether the doctor has sympathy for the women's
suffering or cares more about what society might think.
8. Is helping to end another's life ever a responsible
act of cooperation.
9. Whether only God should decide when a person's life
should end.
10. What values the doctor has set for himself in his
own personal code of behavior.
11. Can society afford to let everybody end their lives
when they want to.
12. Can society allow suicides or mercy killing and still
protect the lives of individuals who want to live.







Mr. Webster was the owner and manager of a gas station. He wanted to hire
another mechanic to help him, but good mechanics were hard to find. The only
person he found who seemed to be a good mechanic was Mr. Lee, but he was Chinese.
While Mr. Webster himself didn't have anything against orientals, he was afraid
to hire Mr. Lee because many of his customers didn't like orientals. His cus-
tomers might take their business elsewhere if Mr. Lee was working in the gas
station.
When Mr. Lee asked Mr. Webster if he could have the job, Mr. Webster said
that he had already hired somebody else. But Mr. Webster really had not hired
anybody, because he could not find anybody who was a good mechanic besides
Mr. Lee.
What should Mr. Webster have done? (Check one)
Should have hired Mr. Lee
Can't decide
Should not have hired his.
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1. Does the owner of a business have the right to make
his own business decisions or not?
2. Whether there is a law that forbids racial dis-
crimination in hiring for jobs.
3. Whether Mr. Webster is prejudiced against orientals
himself or whether he means nothing personal in
refusing the job.
4. Whether hiring a good mechanic or paying attention
to his customers' wishes would be best for his
business.
S. What individual differences ought to be relevant in
deciding how society's roles are filled'
6. Whether the greedy and competitive capitalistic
system ought to be completely abandoned.
7. Do a majority of people in Mr, Webeter's society feel
like his customers or are a majority against prejudice?
8. Whether hiring capable men like Mr. Lee would use
talents that would otherwise be lost to society.
9. Would refusing the job to Mr. Lee be consistent with
Mr. Webster's own moral beliefs?
10. Could Mr. Webster be so hard-hearted as to refuse the
job, knowing how much it means to Mr. Lee?
11. Whether the Christian commandment to love your fellow
man applies to this case.
12. If someone's in need, shouldn't he be helped re-
gardless of what you get back from him?







Fred, a senior in high school, wanted to publish a mimeographed newspaper
for students so that he could express many of his opinions. He wanted to speak
out against the war in Viet Nam and to speak out against some of the school's
rules, like the rule forbidding boys to wear long hair.
When Fred started his newspaper, he asked his principal for permission.
The principal said it would be all right if before every publication Fred
would turn in all his articles for the principal's approval. Fred agreed and
turned in several articles for approval. The principal approved all of them
and Fred published two issues of the paper in the next two weeks.
But the principal had not expected that Fred's newspaper would receive
so much attention. Students were se excited by the paper that they began to
organize protests against the hair regulation and other school rules. Angry
parents objected to Fred's opinions. They phoned the principal telling him
that the newspaper was unpatriotic and should not be published. As a result
of the rising excitement, the principal ordered Fred to stop publishing. He
gave as a reason that Fred's activities were disruptive to the operation of
the school.
Should the principal stop the newspaper? (Check one)
Should stop it
Can't decide
Should not stop it
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1. Is the principal more responsible to students or
to parents?
2. Did the principal give his word that the newspaper
could be published for a long time, or did he just
promise to approve the newspaper one issue at a
time?
3. Would the students start protesting even more if
the principal stopped the newspaper?
4. When the welfare of the school is threatened, does
the principal have the right to give orders to
students?
S. Does the principal have the freedom of speech to
say "no" in this case?
6. If the principal stopped the newspaper would he be
preventing full discussion of important problems?
7. Whether the principal's order would make Fred lose
faith in the principal.
8. Whether Fred was really loyal to his school and
patriotic to his country.
9. What effect would stopping the paper have on the
student's education in critical thinking and
judgment?
10. Whether Fred was in any way violating the rights of
others in publishing his own opinions.
11. Whether the principal should be influenced by some
angry parents when it is the principal that knows
best what is going on in the school.
12. Whether Fred was using the newspaper to stir up
hatred and discontent.






7,corIng Key for th._ Jefining, IzEues iezt
Corresponding 3tage „;cores for each Dilemma
Issue Statements
Story 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 P 9 10 11 12
Heinz 4 3 2 i.: 3 4 6 A 5A 3 5A
Ltudents 3 4 2 5A 5A 3 6 4 3 A 5B 4
Prisoner 3 4 A 4 6 m 3 4 3 4 5A 5A
Doctor 3 4 A 2 5A t-1 3 6 4 5b 4 5A
Webster 4 4 3 2 6 A 5A 5A 5B 3 4 3







B=Moderately Disagree E=Strongly Agree
1. Man is a being in search of meaning. ABCDR
2. Art teaches the significance of life. ABCDE
3. I feel that nothing is "off limits" for exploration of 1-sychelegy.A B C D E
4. reople shculd not be allowed to say irresponsible things. ABCDE
5. ;4:)st things should be done for the sheer joy of it. ABCDE
6. I feel the American way of life is the only way. ABCDE
7. i.,any of the values we have today are based on myth. ABCD E
I have just about the tame values now as I did some time ago. ABCDE
9. l',orality can best be determined by the individual and not
the society at large. ABCD E
to. Publicizing our differences weakens our country's image. ABCDE
11. If I wanted to find out information about Jommunism I would
ask information from a Communist. ABC.) E
12. ;.;ost people who take "L3D" are trying to e.,cape from responsi-
bility. ABCDE
13. Life begins at any moment through the act of reali-ation. AzC.)
14. Children should measure up to the standards set by their
parents. ABCDE
15. :he only real worthwhile learninc, comes from within. ABCD
16. .tuotas in our Immigration laws are necessary to preserve the
minimum wage. ABCDE
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17. Whatever there is of progress in life comes not through adjustment
but through daring. ABCDE
18. Lou should receive government penalties for advocating bad
causes. ABCDE
19. Al] phenomena, including man and his thought about himself
are in constant movement and change. ABCDE
20. Freak portrayals of sex in movies and books should be subject
to strict censorship. ABCD E
21. The only learning which significantly influences behavior is
self discovered. ABCDE
22 itebels and student activists make more noise than is warranted. ABCDE
23 You never really learn anything unless you experience it
yourself. ABCDE
24. I let my experience carry me towards goals that I can but
dimly define. ABCDE
25. lo learn to think, feel, and see in my own way is the most
important thing. ABCDE
Scoring Procedure
1. Items 1, 2, 13, 15, 17, 19, 21, 23, 24, and 25 are distractor items and are
not used in the scoring procedures.
2. Items 3, 5, 7, 9, and item 11 are scored so that A..1, B2, C.3„ 13i4, and E'S.
3. Items that remain are reversed scored 30 that A=5, 13=4, C=3, D=2, and Esq.
4. :he summation of the 15 items is the final raw abstract score.
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PRECEDING IMAGE HAS BEEN
REFILMED
TO ASSURE LEGIBILITY OR TO
CORRECT A POSSIBLE ERROR
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